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by Byron Warnken 
On June 9, 1975, a unanimous Sup-
reme Court held, in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 
421 U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (1975), 
that the law of the State of Maine, which 
required a murder defendant to prove 
by a fair preponderance of the evidence 
that he acted in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation, in order to reduce 
the homocide to manslaughter, violates 
the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
At the 1966 trial of Stillman E. Wilbur, 
Jr., the court, in its charge to the jury, in-
structed " ... that 'malice aforethought is 
an essential and indispensable element 
of the crime of murder, without which 
the homocide would be manslaughter. 
The jury was further instructed, how-
ever, that if the prosecution established 
that the homocide was both intentional 
and unlawful, malice aforethought was 
to be conclusively implied unless the de-
fendant proved by a fair preponderance 
of the evidence that he acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation, ... 
(and) by proving the latter the defendant 
would negate the former and reduce the 
homocide from murder to manslaugh-
ter." Id. at 1883-84. Upon conviction for 
murder, Wilbur appealed to the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court, contending 
that he had been denied due process of 
law as set forth inIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970), which required the prosecu-
tion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime charged. The Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the 
Winship requirement had been met, and 
that the burden placed upon the defen-
dant went only to the degree of the crime 
and sentencing. "(I)n Maine murder and 
manslaughter are not distinct crimes but 
rather different degree of the single 
generic offense of felonious homocide. 
State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (1971)." 
95 S.Ct. at 1884. The court also refer-
enced over a century of using this pre-
sumption of implied malice aforethought 
and the ensuing defendant's burden. In 
addition, the court anticipated no re-
troactivity of Winship, a conclusion 
which was later proven incorrect in Ivan 
v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 
(1972). 
Wilbur then petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court 
for Maine. Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. 
Supp. 149 (1972). The District Court 
held that (1) murder and manslaughter 
are distinct offenses under Maine sta-
tutes, (2) malice aforethought is the dis-
tinguishing element, and (3) In re Win-
ship does not permit the prosecution to 
rely upon a presumption of malice, but 
requires the prosecution to prove malice 
aforethough beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, although acknowledging that the 
state court must interpret its own laws, 
affirmed, Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 
943 (lstCir. 1973), stating that " ... a to-
tally unsupportable construction which 
leads to an invasion of constitutional due 
process is a federal matter." Id. at 945. 
When seven months later the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed its 
view and criticized the First Circuit, the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and remanded to the Court of Appeals, 
414 U.S. 1139 (1974). The First Circuit 
again relied on Winship, and the Sup-
reme Court again granted certiorari, 419 
U.S. 823 (1974), this time affirming. 
After tracing the common law de-
velopment, the court, through Mr. Jus-
tice Powell, noted that the presence or 
absence of the heat of passion on sud-
den provocation has been the single 
most important factor in determining the 
degree of culpability attaching to an un-
lawful homocide and thqt the clear trend 
indicates that a large majority of the 
States now requires the prosecution to 
bear the ultimate burden of proving the 
fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 95 S. 
Ct. at 1888. 
Relying heavily upon Winship, the 
court nullified Maine's argument that the 
stigma of a felony has already attached 
and the defendant's burden goes merely 
to gradation: 
The safeguards of due process are 
not rendered unavailing simply be-
cause a determination may already 
have been reached that would stig-
matize the defendant and that might 
lead to a significant impairment of 
personal liberty. The fact remains 
that the consequences resulting from 
a verdict of murder, as compared 
with a verdict of manslaughter, differ 
significantly. 
The result, in a case such as this one 
where the defendant is required to 
prov<~ the critical fact in dispute, is to 
increase further the likelihood of an 
erroneous murder conviction. Such a 
result directly contravenes the princi-
ple (that) ... 'where one party has at 
stake an interest of transcending 
value - as a criminal defendant his 
liberty - th(e) margin of error is re-
duced as to him by the process of 
placing on the (prosecution) the bur-
den ... of persuading the factfinder at 
the conslusion of the trial...' (cites 
omitted) 
(T)his is the traditional burden which 
our system of criminal justice deems 
essential. 
(W)e discern no unique hardship on 
the prosecution that would justify re-
quiring the defendant to carry the 
burden of proving a fact so critical to 
criminal culpability. Id. at 1889-91. 
The Mullaney decision has direct and 
immediate implications for Maryland, 
which has preViously placed a burden 
upon the defendant similar to that im-
posed by Maine. In Burko v. State, 19 
Md. App. 645 (1974), cert. denied, 271 
Md. 732 (1974), the appellant, con-
victed of second degree murder and 
armed robbery, claimed a denial of due 
process in an instruction that advised the 
jury that in Maryland there exists a pre-
sumption that all homocides are commit-
ted with malice and constitute second 
degree murder, thus placing a burden on 
the defendant to establish by " ... a fair 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
killing happened under certain cir-
cumstances to redl'ce the homocide to 
manslaughter." Id. at 659. In affirming 
the conviction, the Court of Special Ap-
peals noted the the appellant's reliance 
upon Winship and the Mullaney deci-
sions of the U.S. District Court and the 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The opin-
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First, the client will benefit from a much 
more personalized and human treat-
ment of his problem and secondly, the 
members of the profession of law will 
have a much healthier attitude towards 








ion acknowledged that Winship has long 
b~en the rule in Maryland, but neverthe-
less held that the " ... Maine statute ... is 
dissimilar to the Maryland statutes con-
cemed with the crime of murder." Id. at 
660-61. The Supreme Court disagreed. 
One week after Mullaney, the high court, 
in Burko v. Maryland, ___ U.S. 
-------,95 S. Ct. 2624 (1975), vacated 
the judgement and the case was re-
manded to the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land for further consideration in light of 
Mullaney v. Wi/bur. 
A unamimous Supreme Court has 
told those states which have failed to join 
the majority in eliminating the homocide 
defendant's burden of redUCing the 
crime to manslaughter that they have 
been violating the constitutional rights of 
due process of law guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. As for the pos-
sibility of retroactive application of Mul-
laney, when one considers the depan-
dence of Mullaney on the Winship hold-
ing, itself retroactively applied, com-
bined with the due process aspects, re-
troactively will almost certainly be an 




Fortunately, we did not experience a 
"blow". 
The terrain is very barren. Seeing 
moss, grass, or dwarf willow trees 
(forty years' old, but one inch in 
height) became a big thing with us. 
But as desolate as the land is, it has a 
stark beauty that you develop an ap-
preciation of. In time I became very 
territorial. One day I discovered an 
area about ten miles from our 
campsite that had been tested for oil 
drilling. How disturbing itwas to me to 
see the mark of man's corporate 
exploitation in an environment previ-
ously unmarked by man. Coke and 
whiskey bottles had made it to 
Bathurst Island. 
We also developed an appreciation 
and respect for snimallife that is able 
to survive in an environment with such 
a limited food supply. The highlight of 
our trip was discovering a herd of ten 
musk oxen. I crawled to within sixty-
five yards of them and was able to take 
some great pictures. The many skele-
tons of muskoxen that we found on the 
tundra were proof of their constant 
fight for survival. The arctic wolves 
are their predators. The musk oxen 
must stay strong and healthy because 
the wolf flourishes on the weak. 
We saw many ring seals; they are 
very alert and always mindful of the 
possible presence of a polar bear and 
his clandestine technique of covering 
his black nose with his white paw. 
There were Peary caribou, a variety of 
caribou quite small in stature. The 
mating season brought an abundance 
of birds including snow geese, snowy 
owls, king eiders, ptarmigans, arctic 
terns, knots, arctic loons, red 
phalaropes, sanderlings, artic gulls, 
and snow buntings. The arctic tern 
lives at the South Pole and commutes 
annually over twenty-two thousand 
miles to the North Pole in order to 
breed. The knowledge that no settle-
ment has ever existed on Bathurst Is-
land must give the birds some incen-
tive to breed there. 
Personally, such an experience al-
lowed me much time to think about 
life and man's position on this earth 
without man-imposed distractions or 
limitations. It made me realize how 
mundane my daily "problems" truly 
are. StUdying law and seeing the many 
conflicts man imposes upon himself 
(either individually or collectively 
through government), further rein-
forced within my own mind that man's 
selfish desires create his own inner-
struggle and emotional trauma. Our 
society has so much materially, but 
we have accomplished so little in de-
veloping man's inter-personal rela-
tionships and in developing a fine 
sense of environmental appreciation. 
Never before did I feel so peaceful in 
mind and so close to nature. 
When asked if I will go back to the 
Arctic, my answer is, "Butof course." 
My wife and I are already planning a 
two week trip for next August to ob-
serve a large caribou migration and to 
catch Arctic Char. 
